
ABSTRACT

The study presents the problems, difficulties, and conflicts associated with the presence of foreign powers in the period of 1945-47, starting with the Soviet occupation and the appearance of the Allied Control Commission. I intend to compare the situation in the countryside (especially in Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun County) and the capital by emphasizing the occupation, the relationship between the occupiers and the population, and the costs of the occupation, especially the sustenance. Is it possible to weight between the hardships of the countryside or the capital? What are the similarities and differences?

How did they cope with the “feeding of the Russian Bear”? In terms of sources, I used the materials of the National Archives of Hungary Pest County Archives, Bács-Kiskun County Archives, Budapest City Archives, as well as memoirs and diaries.

KEY WORDS:
occupation, Red Army, Allied Control Commission, sustenance

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INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with a critical period in Hungarian history with extraordinary pressures on society and economy. The country had been occupied by the Red Army from the turning point of 1944/45 to the 10th of February, 1947, when the peace-treaty was ratified. The legal background of the occupation was secured by the armistice agreement signed on the 20th of January, 1945. The document disposed that it is the Hungarian Government’s duty to provide the Soviet Army not just food, but other products, like manufactured goods. The situation was similar in the neighboring countries like Romania and Australia as they also had to pay the expenses of the unanticipated “guest”. As it was significant to oversee the materialization of the regulations and requests of the armistice agreement, the Allied Control Commission (ACC) had been established. There were other precedents for it in Europe, as there were ACCs in Italy, Romania, Finland, Bulgaria, Austria, Germany and Japan, as well.

In this paper I intend to present the hardships of everyday life during the occupation of Hungary in the last days and after WW II., the challenges of financing the presence of the army and the ACC, especially their sustenance. This perspective gives an opportunity to compare the situation in Budapest and in the countryside, specifically in Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun county. I explore the institutions and the communication between the local military commandants and the ACC. In this research I have used primary sources from the Archives and ego-documents.

FROM THE APPEARANCE OF THE RED ARMY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

For Stalin, reaching Berlin as soon as possible was the priority, so Malinovsky and the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which had reached the Carpathian Basin, did not receive either military reserves or adequate supplies. In the armored battle of the Great Plain in October 1944, they also suffered heavy losses and had to advance with only a minimal number of armored forces.¹ There was not enough fuel and ammunition, and the supply of the front was also interrupted.²

The fighting in the territory of Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun county has begun already in October 1944, since on the 28th Stalin ordered Malinovsky to leave for Budapest within 24 hours, despite the fact, that additional reinforcements would have been needed.³ The Soviet troops

¹ Nevenkin 2014. 77.
² Nevenkin 2014. 80–81.
³ Ungváry 2013. 13.
advanced with great difficulty, the first settlement in the county, Zsámbok, was captured only on the 16th of November, with the help of the 7th Romanian Infantry Corps.  

By the beginning of November 1944, the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front had managed to reach the Attila Line protecting the eastern part of the capital from the direction of Kecskemét, then with the joining of the center and right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the encirclement of the Budapest siege ring began. The fighting for the capture of the capital dragged on until the 13th of February, exposing the 800–900,000 population of the city trapped inside to destruction and starvation.  

The protracted fighting also took its toll on the rural population. The luckier settlements escaped without major damage, but in many places they “changed hands” four or five times. The forests and fields were full of trenches, tank traps and mines, and their elimination caused a serious problem even after the war, slowing down agricultural work.  

Between 1944 and 1947, Hungary became an occupied country under international law. Local Soviet military commanders were established in the settlements, which oversaw the resumption of life and, above all, public administration. Budapest also had its own Soviet City Command, led by Major General P. N. Chernisov and then Major General I. T. Zamertsev. The latter held this role from February 1945 until 1948.  

Parallel to the progress of the front, the armistice agreement was also concluded in Moscow on the 20th of January in 1945, by János Gyönyösi, János Vörös and János Balogh on behalf of the Provisional National Government, and by the chairman of the Allied Control Committee, Marshal K. J. Vorosilov, as a representative of the Allies. Point 11 of the armistice agreement stipulated that the Hungarian government was obliged to regularly pay money in Hungarian currency and make goods, equipment and services available to the Allied (Soviet) High Command and the ACC. Point 12 provided for reparations, which also caused serious economic problems for Hungary, but this study does not intend to deal with this. Point 18, however, provided for the establishment of the Allied Control Commission, whose task was, in theory, to oversee the implementation of the armistice terms. However, the appendix provided them with a number of rights that gave them the opportunity to actively intervene in political and economic life, for example authorizing the publication, import and distribution of press products.  

The ACC operated under the chairmanship of the Soviets, with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. The Soviets did not allow much input from the British and Americans, who only had advisory powers. This was in line with the results of the February 1945 Yalta Conference. Although the “Big Three” did not declare the division of Europe, from military strategic aspects it was already clear that East-Central Europe (and Hungary) would fall into the sphere of Soviet interests.  

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4 Bank 1984. 73.; Ignácz 2015. 36.  
5 Bank 1984. 72.  
7 Tarnai 2021.  
8 Text of the armistice: https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=94500005.tv (Download: 2022. 10. 14.)  
9 Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/hunga01.asp (Download: 2022. 10. 14.)  
10 Borhi 2015. 85.
The representatives of the ACC first settled in Debrecen in March 1945, and then moved to Budapest in April after the passage of the front, following the Provisional National Government. Of course, restored, furnished apartments had to be provided for their arrival. Each mission had a different center, Marshal Vorosilov, for example was accommodated in a vacant palace on Andrássy street, in the “Soviet colony” that was already forming at that time.\(^{11}\)

The Soviet branch of ACC sent representatives to every county, for whom the locals had to furnish the “most beautiful palaces and castles”, and they also sent their own supervisors to oversee the most important companies.\(^{12}\) Thanks to a transcript of the Ministry of Provisioning, we also know that in mid-March, in Debrecen, the head of each country had already been revealed. I have listed all of the names below in the table, with informations that could be found in each case. Colonel Kazakov should be singled out, as he was in contact with the county government commissioner in the county of Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun regarding supply matters.\(^{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Name and rank of the commissioner</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun and Budapest</td>
<td>Kazakov Dmitirij Dimitrijevic, colonel</td>
<td>In 1946 he received the silver grade of the Hungarian Freedom Order of Merit.(^{14})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borsod</td>
<td>S. T. Ivanovic colonel commissar</td>
<td>In 1946 he received the silver grade of the Hungarian Freedom Order of Merit.(^{15})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok</td>
<td>O. N. Konstantínovic lieutenant colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csongrád-Csanád</td>
<td>P. P. Dimitrijevic colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolna, Somogy</td>
<td>O. F. Afanajевич lieutenant colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajdú</td>
<td>E. A. Grigorjevic colonel commissar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Békés, Bihar</td>
<td>M.-N. Ivan Stepanovic major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szabolcs-Szatmár</td>
<td>S. A. Ivanovic major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baranya, Bács-Bodrog</td>
<td>O. M. Afanaszjevic colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heves, Nógrád</td>
<td>A. S. Grigorjevic guard major</td>
<td>In 1946 he received the silver grade of the Hungarian Freedom Order of Merit.(^{16})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zemplén</td>
<td>D. P. Petrovic lieutenant colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abaúj-Tolna</td>
<td>L. S. Pavlovic guard major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. ACC representatives of the counties. Source: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltár Bács-Kiskun Megyei Levéltár. Vörös Hadsereget Ellátó Osztály Iratai. 11214/1945.

\(^{11}\) Ungváry – Tabajdi 2013. 106.

\(^{12}\) Feitl 2003. 10.; Földesi 2009. 84.


\(^{14}\) 10.281/1946. Magyar Közlöny (no. 202.)

\(^{15}\) 24.496/1946. Magyar Közlöny (no. 295)

\(^{16}\) 10.281/1946. Magyar Közlöny (no. 202.)
Among the missions, the Soviet one was the largest, a list of the hundred most important members was sent to the foreign minister in March 1945. The interesting thing about this is that the county commissioners were not on the ACC list. In addition, staff had to be provided for the missions, including housekeepers, cooks, confectioners, and servers.17

The two faces of the Red Army

The Soviet troops were exhausted by the time they reached Hungary, and they also had to face the fact that Hungary did not sign the armistice, but continued to fight alongside the Germans. According to Kamen Nevenkin, this – and, of course, the Soviet propaganda – may have contributed to the fact that the Soviet soldiers continued to fight furiously and cruelly.18 In addition, by mid-April 1945, the Red Army had lost nearly 150,000 men. This was only aggravated by the Soviet propaganda against the Germans and their allies, the indiscipline of the troops, the experience of the Western standard of living for the soldiers, mostly of peasant origin, and the excessive consumption of alcohol.19

The Hungarian population generally reacted to the appearance of the Soviet soldiers in two ways, and this characterized both the rural and urban population. There were those who greeted them with warmly and waited for the fighting to end thanks to the Soviets. This can also be seen, as there were many settlements that had to be evacuated several times due to the protracted fighting, and the buildings and agricultural equipment there were also destroyed. The remaining Jews in the capital and the population with communist sentiments or simply hoping for a new beginning also awaited the entry of the Red Army as a form of liberation.

In the published memoirs of Soviet soldiers, of course, they tried to stress this positive narrative, and the photo of the Soviet soldier handing out chocolate to the children became a symbol of this.

Mainly in diaries and memoirs of inhabitants of Budapest, we can see that people who possessed valuable and useful knowledge for the Soviets – particularly if they knew a few sentences in Russian —, were not harmed. The interpreters were certainly in the best position.

Tamás Szappanyos lived through the siege of Budapest as a child and in his diary, he tells the story of his mother, that is atypical in several ways. She spoke Russian well, so the Soviets immediately used her services as an interpreter and took her sewing jobs. In return, her family had not been harassed, and in fact, they regularly received food and warm meals. It gives a good impression of the conditions at the time that it turned out afterwards that the food had been collected from the neighbors earlier.20

It often happened, that a Soviet soldier stood in with a family and took them under their protection against his comrades. For many, getting a “Sasha” during the transition period meant survival.

However, the majority did not experience the occupation as liberation at all, which confirmed the anti-Russian propaganda between the two world wars. The phrase “rape and pillage” used

17 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára XIX-J-61. A Szövetséges Ellenőrző Bizottság Magyar Gazdasági Hivatal
18 Nevenkin 2014. 82–83.
19 L. Balogh 2015. 46.
20 Szappanyos 2015. 43–44.
by Tony Judt and Béni L. Balogh gives a good impression of the actions of the Soviet soldiers. In
the Hungarian language, the term “zabrálás” has spread, which refers to the widespread form of
behavior in which the Soviets took the property of the civilian population by force. In Budapest,
we can mainly talk about watches, clothes and jewelry, and in the countryside about food stocks,
live animals, and production tools. Farms inhabited by the agrarian proletariat fared particularly
badly, where the Soviets often found nothing of value, so this was retaliated against the locals.21

Moreover, in the countryside, the settlements that had become battlefields were evacuated by
the Hungarian authorities from October 1944, and those who remained there were assigned by the
Soviets to work on ramparts and holed up in their apartment buildings. This caused a serious dilemma
for the population, since they could only take food, warm clothes, blankets and cooking utensils
with them to the areas designated for the refugees – all their other possessions had to be destroyed or
left behind. The expropriation of residences often happened in Budapest as well, during the house
to-house fighting of the Siege of Budapest. Soviet soldiers moved en masse into rooms, which they
had had repaired with the residents, and food had to be provided for them at the same time.22

In addition to looting, sexual violence and the abduction of the civilian population to “Malen-
kij robot” took on massive proportions. Romanian, Serbian and Bulgarian troops also marched
through Hungary, who also ran amok freely.23 However, the swings of the Soviet troops became
more and more embarrassing, not only for the Hungarian communists, but also for the top lead-
ership of the army, who tried to curb the violence with several orders, with rather less success.24

The violence and swings did not subside even after the occupation, and public safety in the
country was in ruins. The extent to which individual settlements were exposed to this largely depended on how the local commander related to the Hungarian population. In addition, there were many influencing factors, e.g. whether the settlement was along a main route. In the spring
of 1945, 300-1,200 people marched through Piliscsaba and Kecel every day – supplies, refugees
and the returned displaced population – who violently demanded their accommodation and care.25 It also had terrible consequences if a large amount of alcohol was stored in the settlement.
In the wine cellars of Budafok, the Soviets literally drowned in wine, and the local commander
had to be replaced twice because of their abuses.26

Soviet soldiers often allied themselves with the local underworld, especially with those who
spoke Russian. Thanks to this, criminals were able to appropriate animals, furniture and other
property by referring to the Soviets.27 At the beginning of 1945, there were many so-called “strip
 robberies”, and the Soviets also appeared on the black markets of Budapest with looted food
and other goods.28

21 RIGÓ 2014. 128.
23 L. BALOGH 2015. 53.
24 L. BALOGH 2015. 52.
25 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára. Pest Megyei Levéltár. IV.401.e 83. doboz 7/1945 (Szada közös-
kérelme Veresegyháza községében liszt lefoglalása iránt); PML IV.401.e 87. doboz 1247/1945. (Cím nélkül)
26 UNGVÁRY 2013. 292–293.
27 MNL OL A Vörös Hadsereg katonáinak atrocitásairól a Szövetséges Ellenőrző Bizottsággal folytatott levelezés
The duplicity of Soviet behavior is clearly indicated by the fact that during 1945, several food loans were granted to the population of more than one city. In this regard, it is worth highlighting Budapest, where the people trapped in the siege ring replenished their food supplies, and shipments could not be counted on for a while due to the paralysis of the infrastructure. However, those coming up from the shelters could get a bowl of hot food at the Soviet camp kitchens. On February 3., 1945, General Chernisov, on behalf of the High Command, allocated 200 tons of flour and the same amount of barley as emergency aid for the capital. In March 1945, another 20,000 tons of food loans were handed over to Budapest and the mining region: grain, flour, sugar, canned meat, cheese, pulses, ersatz coffee and live cattle. The live cattle were then distributed among farmers in Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun County for keeping. It is a fly in the ointment that the second aid - almost 25,000 pengos - had to be paid back in the economic year 1946/47.

**The Weight of Sustenance**

There is no information about the exact size of the army that the Hungarian government had to take care of, but their number can be estimated at 500-800 thousand. Reports on the number of occupying troops in the county of Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun were also prepared on some larger settlements. In Kecskemét at the beginning of 1945 their number exceeded 40 thousand, and in Gödöllő 20–25 thousand were stationed, both numbers greatly exceeded the population living there. The occupiers not only had to be provided with accommodation, but Soviet military hospitals, horse hospitals and prisoner of war camps were also set up in many places, which of course had to be provided by the settlements.

In the first period and even in the first quarter of 1945, the Red Army was supplied directly. This meant that local supplies were seized and used in already liberated areas, as reported to several chieftains:

"H.M. resident of Péteri reports, that in December 1944, the Russian military took 12 ducks, 18 hens, 1 hen, 1 fattening pig weighing 2 q, 1 pig weighing 70 kg, 18 q of corn, 7 q of barley, 6 q of oats, 50 kg of flour, 48 q of straw, 48 q of hay, 6 q of potatoes, 3 q of sunflower seeds, 1 one and a half year old heifer, and 10 fruit trees were sawed down. All this without compensation."

After that, a multi-stage process for the procurement of crops was built. As a first step, the Allied Soviet High Command determined how much they needed from each product in each quarter, since they sent these in four-monthly increments. The Ministry of Provisioning distributed these numbers among the counties. The Public Supply Inspectorates, in agreement with the county government commissioner, i.e., the Government Commissioner for Provisioning assigned the service to the districts, and then the district clerks distributed it among the individual settlements.
In March 1945, it was even suggested that a separate government commissioner would be needed to deal with the supply of the Red Army, but in the end the parties rejected this idea.35

The biggest concern, however, was the production of crops, since the Soviets themselves caused enormous damage to agriculture.

They grazed the crops with their animals, cut down the fruit trees, and harvested the stock of the fish ponds without limits. As with other acts of violence, the local authorities were powerless here as well. The only option was a written report addressed to the county government commissioner and ACC to investigate the case. In the summer of 1946, the ACC already addressed the Red Army Commands with a decree that “strictly prohibits the use of all arbitrary fruits and vegetables”.36 However, the problem was caused by the fact that the crops transported unofficially from the settlements were not included officially in the booked supplies intended to supply the Red Army. The stocks could only be handed over to the Soviet commissioners in exchange for an official acknowledgment of receipt, and the identity of the soldier was also informed about in advance. On the Soviet side, the request was that if possible, the same person should always be present at the exchange.37 However, there were also hitches, if the products were not found to be of high enough quality, e.g. the apple was wormy or the cucumber turned yellow, hence the trustees did not accept it. However, many frauds were reported in connection with the measurements of the Soviets: neither the wagons carrying the hay, nor the actual weight of the live animals were not acknowledged. To solve this, the ACC assigned one representative to the handovers.38

In theory, the supplies intended for the Red Army could only be used from the stocks left after the Hungarian compulsory produce delivery, but agriculture was not ready for such a load. For this reason, the farmers turned to the headmaster to exempt them from the service,

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35 Horváth et al. 2003. 38.
36 MNL OL PML IV.401.e 26607/1946.
37 MNL OL PML IV.401.e 840/1946.
38 MNL OL PML IV.401.e 3600/1946
but this only happened in the rarest of cases. It was somewhat easier that the Soviets allowed the replacement of certain crops with other crops during the summer-autumn drought months, e.g. peas instead of beans.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite this, Kazakov reported to the county government commissioner several times that “the delivery of agricultural crops is not satisfactory”, which “creates a condition that causes damage to the military supply of the Red Army” and that Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun County is in worst place among the counties in the accomplishment.\textsuperscript{40} The Soviets demanded large amount of fresh vegetables and fruits, flour and cereals, as well as fodder, but the quantity of meat products was also massive compared to the Hungarian livestock.\textsuperscript{41} In the case of Kecskemét, it happened that the meat produce delivery to the Soviets had to be granted from the Hungarian milk supply as there were only cows.\textsuperscript{42}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Obligation of produce delivery</th>
<th>Delivered</th>
<th>% accomplished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>293,5</td>
<td>63,5</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hay</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>296,6</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>0,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>63,4</td>
<td>0,63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egg (1000 pcs)</td>
<td>57,6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. MNL OL PML IV.401.e 293/1946. Accounts of Kazakov from 1946, delivered to Aladár Pongrácz, county government commissioner of Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun county. During the spring period (May–August), the county had a hard time completing the produce delivery.

The farmers did receive some financial compensation for the crops, but this came to them from the Ministry of Provisioning, through the county government commissioner. However, the Ministry was often late with payments, so the municipalities in a difficult financial situation had to give the products in advance. In addition, the farmers themselves could only purchase many crops from the free market, from other counties or from Budapest, at extremely high prices, which only increased with the release of inflation.

In 1946, the Soviet occupiers in the settlements around Budapest rented several agricultural areas (a total of 56 cadastral lots), probably to ensure their own supplies. However, even after the signing of the peace treaty, the territories were used in the following distribution:

\textsuperscript{39} MNL OL PML IV.401.e 576/1946
\textsuperscript{40} MNL OL PML IV.401.e 293/1946
\textsuperscript{41} MNL OL PML IV.401.e 1722/1945 A Vörös Hadsereg III. negyedévi ellátása
\textsuperscript{42} MNL OL BKML IV.1910.r. 1336/1946
Table 3. MNL OL PML IV:401.e 3550/1947. Rented agricultural areas of the Red Army

Just like in the case of the Red Army, the Hungarian government had to bear all the costs of the ACC’s staying in Hungary. The various expenses were channeled through the Office of Reparations, even though they were not included in the reparation’s payments. This study intends to focus on the Soviet mission, but since the relevant source material is very incomplete, I occasionally refer to the provision of the English and American missions as well.

The task was carried out by the Economic Office of the Allied Control Commission set up on March 9, 1945. On the one hand, it consisted of a three-member interdepartmental committee: the delegates of the Prime Minister’s delegate (chairman), the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Provisioning. The head of the office was Jenő Soós, chief accounting adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The office VI. dealt with the transport, storage and distribution of food, various maintenance works, procurement tasks and administration related to accounting. From February 12, 1946, the tasks of the Hungarian Economic Office were taken over by the Office of Reparations, in which a separate department dealt with the ACC.

The supplies needed for provisioning were obtained from the countryside with the cooperation of the procurement groups of the Ministry of Provisioning, who delivered e.g. dry pasta, rice and eggs from Békéscsaba. The commissioned persons were provided with means of transport and vehicles, and their task was to purchase the predetermined stocks. On the one hand,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Crop production</th>
<th>Territorial (cadastral)</th>
<th>Name of unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pestszentlőrinc</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Russian Military Command of Kispest and Pestszentlőrinc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piliscsaba</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Russian unit in the military camp of Piliscsaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomáz</td>
<td>Garden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian unit in Szentendre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomáz</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Russian unit in Szentendre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomáz</td>
<td>Fruit trees</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Russian unit in Szentendre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szentendre</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Russian unit in Szentendre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szentendre</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russian unit in Szentendre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szentendre</td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russian unit in Szentendre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szentendre</td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Russian unit in Szentendre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 Nomination: 2.730/1945
44 FÖLDESÍ 2009. 93.
45 MNL OL XIX-J-61 1266. sz. jegyzőkönyv
rural procurement was done for cost-effectiveness, since food could be purchased cheaper, and on the other hand, the low stocks of the capital could not be used for this purpose. Similar to the supply of the civilian population, the stocks had to be stored and then distributed according to a “quality ration system”. Even though the central management of ACC’s food distribution worked according to strict rules and they had to account for the issued head rations, this did not deter the members of the missions from having their guests dine in one of the luxurious restaurants reserved for them.

The members of ACC were not satisfied with the bread ration of 20 dekas provided to the civilian population. Their demand list included various vegetables, such as lettuce, cucumbers, pumpkins, peppers, potatoes; legumes, fruit, sugar, saccharin, honey, lots of meat, pork, beef, veal, duck, goose, chicken, bacon, eggs, and dairy products. In addition, the amount of alcohol had to be ensured, from wine to whiskey. To supply the Soviet mission of ACC, 495 pigs were given to Hungarian farmers for fattening, from which 30,000 kilos of meat were expected in January 1947. From the menus of the British and American missions in November 1945, we can also see what kind of dishes they expected from their “hosts”:

„Lunch, November 27.: warm goose liver, potato, green salad, cheese, butter, tea
Dinner: Mushroom soup, fried chicken, potato, cabbage, salad, cake, apple, butter, tea”

It was not only the daily meals that had to be provided, but various events, tea parties, and banquets, which were either organized by ACC and the Soviet mission or organized for them. To ensure quality entertainment, several clubs had to be maintained, e.g. the Park Club on Stefания street.

There have been several attempts to stop excessive spending. In January 1946, Lieutenant General Sviridov, who replaced Vorosilov, proposed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the sums requested by the missions be disbursed only after confirmation by the Chief of Staff of the ACC. However, this could not be successful, because in the spring of 1946 Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy had to call together the representatives of the ACC to indicate their needs in money and set up separate shops for them. With the release of inflation, it became more and more difficult to ensure payments, so in January 1946, the supply was entrusted to a newly founded corporation in Budapest, ran by the capital itself. That meant that the amount of goods to be delivered was referred to the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a large loan was also provided for this matter. Thus, similarly to the supply of the Red Army, the supply of the ACC could only be covered by loans.

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46 FÖLDESI 2009. 89.
47 MNL OL XIX-J-61 A Szövetséges Ellенőrző Bizottság Magyar Gazdasági Hivatala
48 FÖLDESI 2009. 89.
49 BFL IV.1409.m K-510/1947 VIII.
50 MNL OL XIX-J-61 A Szövetséges Ellenőrző Bizottság Magyar Gazdasági Hivatala
51 FÖLDESI 2009. 90.
### Economic year 1945/46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expences of the ACC</td>
<td>33 385 646,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses of the Military Command of Red Army</td>
<td>474 350,94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisioning of Red Army</td>
<td>60 343 601,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash supply for Red Army</td>
<td>7 000 000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial supplies for Red Army</td>
<td>21 779 208,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prices of medicines and lints provided for Red Army</td>
<td>36 762,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of public buildings for the winter accommodation of Red Army</td>
<td>410 923,09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vörös Hadsereg összesen</td>
<td>90 044 845,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>123 430 492,16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic year 1946/47

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash for ACC</td>
<td>48 060,78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction costs related to the placement of ACC</td>
<td>2 187,83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase costs of necessary equipment and furnishings related to the placement of ACC</td>
<td>558 726,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC food costs</td>
<td>6 140,15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other placement costs of ACC</td>
<td>4 575,63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other material expenses of ACC</td>
<td>4 327,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>624 018,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial supplies for Red Army</td>
<td>31 229,15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisioning of Red Army</td>
<td>74 713,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of communities in relation to the accommodation of Red Army</td>
<td>3 997,41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation of occupying troops</td>
<td>127 423,24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications services provided to the Red Army</td>
<td>35 162,69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash supply for Red Army</td>
<td>94 068,56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>366 594,69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4. Appropriation Accounts from 1945/46 and 1946/47**

In the economic year 1945/46, the costs of supplying the ACC accounted for 88.7% of the expenditures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the food of the Red Army alone accounted for 63.9% of the payments of the Ministry of Provisioning.\(^{52}\) It is therefore no wonder that the supply of the Red Army in 1945 not only depleted the country’s food stocks, but also the state coffers, consuming 10.7% of the budget in the 1945/46 economic year.\(^{53}\) In addition, the provision of the ACC consumed a lot of money, 41,000 pengos per day in April 1945 alone, which increased only gradually during the year, even taking inflation into account.\(^{54}\)

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52 Állami Zárszámadás az 1945/46-os évre
53 Honvári 2014. 91.
54 Földesi 2009. 91.
period, the situation did not improve either, neither in the case of the supply of the ACC nor the Red Army, so it was impossible to keep the budgeted expenses.

Although with the signing of the peace treaty on February 10, 1947, the Allied Control Committee was liquidated in Hungary and the Soviet troops had to be withdrawn from the territory of the country within 90 days, but because of Austria, the Soviet Union still had the right to station troops.

My study attempted to present the trials of the Hungarian countryside and Budapest from the point of view of economic damage, starting with the appearance of the occupiers. In spite of prioritizing the population of the cities and industrial regions by the government – anticipating the communist party state’s perception of the workers and peasants – through the rationing system during the period of reconstruction, citizens and peasants had to deal with very similar hardships. Production and work had to be started in the midst of deprivation, destruction and looting, and in the meantime the occupiers had to be provided for.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY:**


