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The activities of the second and third Orbán governments in the first hundred days



ABSTRACT

The subject of the present study is an examination of the activities of two governments with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. For the past 10 years, it has been these governments with two closed cycles of government that have had the authority to structurally transform the Hungarian political system without the involvement of the opposition. The study will also present the measures taken over the first hundred days, as well as, to a lesser extent, the political environment of each government and the predestined goals. The summary also highlights some similarities and differences in the speed and quality of government work and its decision-making, which requires a qualified majority.

KEYWORDS

first hundred days, decision-making requiring a qualified majority, two-thirds

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INTRODUCTION

The first hundred days of the new government in most countries functions as a kind of grace period, at the same time, this period occupies a relevant position in Hungarian public policy and public thinking, and the government measures implemented in it. The thematic appearance of the first hundred days can be expected from 2002, but even the first government after the change of regime realized that the political action of the post-election period could be crucial. The hundred days came to a special political context in *Hungary*, as after the parliamentary elections held in the spring, until 2018, the municipal elections were held in the autumn of the election year, which caused a protracted campaign. This prompted those who came to power to become more active and encouraged them to take advantage of the “honeymoon effect” to prepare for another competition.

THE 2010 ELECTION

To examine the activities of the second *Orbán government* in the first hundred days, it is also worth examining the narrow political environment in which they came to power.

In 2010, it seemed certain that the government of the *MSZP-SZDSZ*, which had been regulating for eight years, would come to an end. The fact that *Fidesz* would gain a two-thirds majority was not really in question, and the fact that such a long-ruling side of government would suffer a catastrophic defeat was not unprecedented either, as there were examples of this in *Britain* in 1997,¹ but American and German examples can also be mentioned.²

With regard to hidden voters, there was no real risk of *Fidesz* support – there was no inconvenience that would have caused a potential voter to hide his or her sympathy during the polls, as opposed to support from the *MSZP* or *Jobbik* – so it is likely that *Fidesz* had the fewest hidden voters. On the other hand, the chances that those who thought themselves to be *Fidesz* voters at the last minute would not choose *Fidesz* because of the “run-off nature” of the election were already more tangible. Thanks to the belief in a sure victory, it could have happened that primary *Fidesz* voters voted for their secondary party preference, as victory was “definitely certain”.³ To prevent this, it could be observed that the party tried hard to communicate the slogan “Only *Fidesz*”.

¹ In the 1997 election, the Labor Party, led by Tony Blair, won an unprecedented victory since the 1930s (418 seats versus 179 Conservatives), moreover, from Scotland and Wales, the right has been completely displaced.

² TÓTH-TÖRÖK 2015.

³ SITTER 2011. 43–56.

The campaign period lasted 79 days, officially starting on January 22, 2010, but *Fidesz* started its election campaign in October 2009, still confronting the government and the *MSZP*. At the same time, the theme of the confrontation has changed, the current theme of demanding early elections had disappeared. The strategy of the *Fidesz* campaign was basically based on the fact that from April 2010 they would govern the country and consider *Jobbik*⁴ as their main competitor. *Jobbik* was clearly a challenge to *Fidesz*'s vote-maximizing efforts, and the party assessed the risk of international political consequences of having to ally with *Jobbik* in qualified majority decision-making.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECOND ORBÁN GOVERNMENT IN THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS

Fidesz initiated a constitutional amendment on the second day of the session, during which *Dr. Tibor Navracsics (Fidesz)*, *Dr. Róbert Révassy (Fidesz)*, *Dr. Bence Rétvári (KDNP)* submitted a proposal as an independent motion. This is not surprising, as *Viktor Orbán* stated at the beginning of governing that the so-called “national unity” formed by the two-thirds majority of *Fidesz* and the *KDNP* in the April elections offers many changes that have not been seen since the change of regime.

One of the concrete promises in the government program and in the *Fidesz* and *KDNP* campaigns was to improve public safety, including the introduction of a three-strike law program⁵ the criminal detention of juvenile offenders⁶ and the tightening⁷ of punishment for minor offenses. The government program was submitted to the *National Assembly* under the title “National Cooperation Program” and its debate began on 25 May. The 85-page document contained 5 chapters of action aimed at restoring the economy and public security, saving public health, creating social security and restoring democratic standards.⁸

The chapter on “National Affairs” appears as a separate section in the document, which in fact sets out the foreign policy direction of the new government based on national identity and pride. In connection with the recovery of the economy, the creation of 1 million new jobs is the goal of the program, as well as the work-based social model. As a result, the public works program also appears in the document. Support for businesses and employees also appears as a goal, and in connection with this, the reduction of bureaucracy also appears. The construction, agriculture and tourism sectors will receive special attention in the program.

⁴ TÓTH-TÖRÖK 2015.

⁵ *Fidesz*'s three-strike law program⁵introduces a new concept into the Penal Code: the concept of a violent recidivist. Those who commit an intentional violent crime against a person three times are so called.

⁶ Confinement is a punishment that can also be applied to juveniles, ie 14-18 year olds.

⁷ Among other things, it has tightened penalties for the most common violations against property. Since the entry into force of the amendment, a person who steals something worth less than twenty thousand forints, or commits embezzlement, fencing, fraud or causing intentional damage not exceeding this amount, may receive a fine of up to HUF 150,000 or confinement. In the case of offenses punishable by confinement, the perpetrator may be detained and subject to expedited legal proceedings, provided that he or she has been caught in the act. The can be confined up for one to a maximum of thirty days, if they commit multiple offenses, the maximum is 45 days.

⁸ Proposal for a decision No. H / 47. 5/22/2010.

With regard to public safety, restoration of trust in the police, adequate equipment and remuneration of the police, and demands to speed up court practice have also been included in the program. In connection with healthcare, in addition to the “usual” financing and care development issues, the concept of drug management appears, which deals with the security of drug supply and the liberalization of pharmacy establishment. Also a new element is the “human resource”, which is to ensure that doctors and specialists who go abroad return home and those who plan to go abroad will stay at home.

The section dealing with social security not only improves the situation of those working in the care system, but also deals with strengthening families and supporting having children. The creation of a home, the support of housing and the improvement of the conditions of the Roma, as well as the promotion of their social integration will also appear.

Finally, the section on democratic norms deals with trust in democracy, the rule of law and constitutionality, but is rather of a political nature dealing with the previous government and is not policy reasoning.

What is interesting about the whole document is that in each chapter there is a definite reference to the governance of the “last eight years” and its negative results or inefficiencies, so worded, clearly describing the condition compared to which the new government intends to deviate from with this program.

Summarizing the first hundred days of the government’s activities, it can be said that the governing parties have appointed people who can be affiliated with the governing parties to head several important institutions that control both the government and the legislature,⁹ and in a hundred days the heads of nearly a hundred state institutions and companies were replaced.

Some measures without claiming completeness:

The government system has been restructured, creating 8 ministries instead of the previous 13, restoring previously abolished administrative and deputy secretaries of state, and introducing the institution of deputy prime minister. The number of members of parliament has also been reduced, so that after the next elections there will be only 200 members of parliament in parliament. They also reduced the number of municipal representatives and changed the rules for municipal elections. The monthly salary of state leaders has been maximized in two million forints, the rules for the election of constitutional judges have been changed, so that the government side can nominate and elect the members of the Constitutional Court. *Pál Schmitt* was elected *President of the Republic*, and *László Domokos*, a representative of *Fidesz*, was elected *Head of the State Audit Office*. The management of public media and the system of media supervision were transformed with the establishment of a new authority, headed by *Fidesz*’s media politician, *Annamária Szalai*, for 9 years. The leaders of the *Tax and Financial Control Office*, *Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority*, *Hungarian railways*, *Hungarian Post*, the police and the army, among others, were replaced.

In connection with the government program presented above, the following key measures have been taken.

⁹ E.g.: the State Audit Office, the Hungarian Competition Authority, media authority.

In the field of public safety:

By amending the Penal Code, the three-strike law program was introduced, the punishment for those who abused teachers was tightened, and, as already mentioned, juveniles could be confined. A person who steals something worth less than twenty thousand forints, or commits embezzlement, fencing, fraud or causing intentional damage not exceeding this amount, may receive a fine of up to HUF 150,000 or confinement. A committee of inquiry into what happened during the 2006 autumn riots was set up and became operational, and compensation was paid to the victims of the 2006 fireworks and the families of the victims. A government commissioner for accountability has been appointed to review government decisions that seem problematic in recent cycles.

Major economic policy decisions:

Among other things, the government announced a 29-point package of measures to keep the deficit target, which included tax cuts, in addition to cutting foreign currency lending, taxing banks and cutting government spending. Thus, the bank tax was introduced, while corporate tax was reduced, seven small taxes and more contributions were abolished. The New *Széchenyi Plan*¹⁰ has been launched, which promises to support small and medium-sized enterprises and some priority areas, primarily using *European Union* funds. Foreign currency lending has been suspended, an eviction moratorium has been imposed and utility bills have been frozen.

In the first hundred days, the government also took a series of symbolic measures. Among its first decisions, *Fidesz* and the *KDNP* decided to make it easier for Hungarians living across the border to acquire Hungarian citizenship more easily.

On the initiative of *Pál Schmitt* from *Fidesz* the chairman of the house,¹¹ on the day of the 90th anniversary of the *Treaty of Trianon*, the *Parliament* held a day of remembrance regarding *Trianon*, on which the *Parliament* had previously passed a separate law on *Fidesz*'s proposal. Due to both initiatives, a diplomatic dispute arose between *Hungary* and *Slovakia*.

The government has decided to post up the political declaration¹² on "National Cooperation" in public institutions. The document, which begins with the motto "Let there be peace, freedom and understanding", was adopted by the Parliament on 14 June with the support of *Fidesz* and the *KDNP* and summarizes how the Prime Minister interpreted the results of the April elections. The statement states that a new social contract was reached in the elections, with which the Hungarians decided to establish a new system, the system of national cooperation.

Constitutional amendments were also made in the first hundred days, the first constitutional amendment was made in May, and the post of deputy prime minister was included in the

¹⁰ The New Széchenyi Plan will be launched on 15 January 2011, focusing on seven development areas. The government intends to fund the program entirely from EU funds, with the primary aim of providing access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). According to the plan, there are four sectoral breakout points in Hungary: the health industry, the green economy, the network economy, which represents the background industries and the Carpathian Basin economic area, and the knowledge economy. In addition, there are three "comprehensive breakout points": building homes, creating work- and performance-oriented economy, and a transit economy.

¹¹ At that time he was still the chairman of the house.

¹² „The National Assembly declares that a new social contract was concluded in the April elections, by which the Hungarians decided to establish a new system, the System of National Cooperation,” the statement states.

constitution, which was undoubtedly necessary in the formation of the new governmental structure. It was also decided that “the number of members of parliament may not exceed two hundred”. With regard to the latter, there is only one explanation for the relative haste, namely that the new power wanted to immediately declare that it had fulfilled its previous promise to reduce the number of MPs. Another amendment to the Constitution made it possible for a deputy mayor to be elected not only from among local representatives but also “from outside”. And with the subsequent submission the government side transformed the previous system of nominating constitutional judges. Later, the provisions of the Constitution concerning the press were also recast. Thus, the order of supervision of public media changed, and it became a constitutional obligation for public radio and public television to participate in the nurture and enrichment of national identity and European identity, Hungarian and minority languages and culture, and the strengthening of national cohesion, and in meeting the needs of national, ethnic, family and religious communities. Clearly, accountability was served by the constitutional amendment allowing, that severance pay “contrary to good morals” be subject to a separate tax retroactively.

The first hundred days of the *Orbán* government’s legislative process are characterized by 55 new laws and amendments to laws from which it can be concluded that very rapid legislative work has developed and an attempt has been made to raise the image of “active government” in the electorate. The latter was also important for *Fidesz* due to the use of the so-called “honeymoon effect”, since municipal elections also took place in the autumn. It is also important to note that, in the legislation of the *Orbán government*, requiring a qualified majority for their adoption, 13 submissions were discussed.¹³

THE 2014 ELECTION

In order for *Fidesz* not to return to government in 2014, it seemed necessary to unite opposition parties. At the same time, since mid-January 2011, there has been an intensifying struggle between opposition actors to control the organization of the coalition and to take the lead on the opposition side. At the same time, by the spring of 2013, it became increasingly clear that the *MSZP* had not disappeared, and even without the *MSZP*, the replacement of the *Orbán*

¹³ On the listing of the Ministries of the Republic of Hungary, reduction of the number of members of the National Assembly; on National Cooperation; on the election of local government representatives and mayors; on amendment of Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments; in order to create legal conditions for public parking; on amendment of the Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian citizenship; a bill on amending the Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, and a bill to amend the Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments and Act LXIV of 1994 on certain issues of the performance of the mayor’s office and the remuneration of local government representatives; on amending the laws necessary to reduce the number of representatives of minority self-governments; on amending the laws necessary to reduce the number of representatives of minority self-governments; on amending the Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. on amending the Act XXXII of 1989 the Act and the Constitutional Court; on amending Act C of 1997 on the Electoral Procedure; a bill on amending the Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, a bill on amending certain laws governing the media and communications, a proposal for a decision setting up an ad hoc committee to nominate the members of the media council of the national media and communications authority, and the proposal to set up a public service foundation; and the proposal to set up a public service foundation; amending the Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, as well as submissions about amending the Act XXXIX of 2000 on the Remuneration and Allowances of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, President of the National Assembly, the President of the Constitutional Court and the President of the Supreme Court.

government was inconceivable and that left-wing opposition parties needed to establish some form of cooperation with the party. There were players of very different status and strength in the left half, such as *LMP*, *DK*, *Milla*, *Szolidaritás*, *4K!* and *Gordon Bajnai*. Their balance of power and tactics decided with whom the MSZP would fight its tactical battle over cooperation.

The pre-selection between 2012-2014 – between *Attila Mesterházy* and *Gordon Bajnai* (with the occasional participation of *Ferenc Gyurcsány*) – was in fact a special pre-selection, whereas the parties often sought to gain acceptance for their own candidacy for prime minister, using the public and the politicizing community of the left. Eventually, by the time the person of prime minister-designate was decided, it was actually too late to conduct a controlled and effective campaign. The parliamentary elections took place on 6 April 2014, during which the ruling *Fidesz-KDNP* party alliance gained a two-thirds majority in the legislature, but they could record a 7.9% decrease in their results, so it was just possible to reach a two-thirds majority. In 2014, *Fidesz* basically campaigned only with the slogan “We will continue”. Thus, they did not really formulate an election program, just a message that they would continue the current government policy if they get in government. The campaign, of course, revealed a roughly 10-point, mostly generally worded, largely well-known program¹⁴ in some forums.

In May 2014, there was another important event not only in Hungarian, but also in European politics, namely the 2014 European Parliament elections, which, as in all countries, had a primarily domestic political significance in *Hungary*.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE THIRD ORBÁN GOVERNMENT IN THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS

The first big step of the newly formed government came in the month of its formation, more precisely on June 25th. The first bill to rescue foreign currency borrowers then came before parliament, which was already one of the government's old debts and was a relief to many thousands of people.

At the beginning of the cycle, a bill on the advertising tax was submitted, which was discussed¹⁵ by the Parliament in an exceptional procedure. In the domestic and international media, it was assessed that the purpose of the tax was to explicitly tax one of the commercial television stations, *RTL Klub*, whereas the tax brackets have been set so that smaller press products pay a symbolic tax of only five per cent while a tax of 40% was levied on those in the highest tax bracket. However, there was nothing in this bracket other than the *RTL Klub*, so a regular war broke out between the TV channel and the government over the advertising tax.

Tensions were further heightened by the adoption by the *National Assembly* on the last day before the summer recess of a bill¹⁶ amending a law on advertising tax promulgated a few days earlier, on the basis of which *RTL Klub* already had a tax liability in the current year. In his explanatory memorandum, the rapporteur referred to the reduction of the possibility of tax

¹⁴ These include increasing domestic resources to finance public debt, changing ownership of the banking sector, and further reducing taxes on labor (the possibility of a reduction in contributions was also mentioned here), cheaper energy and full employment.

¹⁵ Bill no. T / 154, 6/2/2014.

¹⁶ Bill no. T / 467, 6/30/2014.

evasion, at the same time, the case aroused the interest of the foreign press, which considered it a measure of the Hungarian government restricting press freedom.

It was already characteristic of the previous government cycle that the government established new advocacy organizations through legislation, such as the *National Chamber of Agricultural Economics*, the *Hungarian Faculty of Law Enforcement*, or the *Hungarian Faculty of Government Officials*. During the period under review, it was the *National Teachers' Faculty* that was established as a new advocacy organization, which, by the force of law, has become the official negotiating partner of the government, and has been endowed with important powers.

In the summer of 2014, the Prime Minister spoke about his political program and vision¹⁷ at the 25th *Bálványos Free University and Student Camp* in *Tusnádfürdő* and within this framework, his explanation¹⁸ of illiberal democracy has caused serious domestic and international repercussions. This topic was even raised at a joint press conference with *German Chancellor Angela Merkel* in 2015, where the *German Chancellor* found the term¹⁹ incomprehensible.

Another significant event was the so-called *Norwegian Fund Case*, which had a precedent that the Hungarian government in early 2014 without the approval of donor countries relocated the management of the nine funds it manages and monitoring of it into the state-owned *Széchenyi Program Office non-profit LLC*. Later, *János Lázár*, *Secretary of State* then in charge of the *Prime Minister's Office*, wrote to *Vidar Helgesen* in a letter to the *Norwegian Minister for European Affairs* criticizing the operation of the *Norwegian Civilian Support Fund* arguing that, in conducting it, the *Ökotárs Foundation*, entrusted by the funding countries, is “more threaded and openly” tied to the *LMP*.²⁰ In his reply, the *Norwegian Minister* emphasized that his government did not support any party political activities in *Hungary* and that the Hungarian operator of the fund had been selected through an open competition.²¹ The unilateral actions of the Hungarian government in early 2014 were considered unacceptable by the donor countries and declared contrary to the rules of the *Norwegian Funds*, therefore, on 9 May 2014, it was decided to suspend payments from the fund in *Hungary*, but did not suspend programs operated independently of the government. Following the government's initiative for a full review of the *Norwegian Fund's* allocation by the *Government Audit Office*, Hungarian Ambassador *Géza Jeszenszky*²² was invited to the *Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs* in *Oslo* on 4 June due to the situation, and a meeting was held in *Brussels* on 12 June between representatives of the Hungarian government and the *Financial Mechanism Committee* representing *Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway*, which maintain the *Norwegian Fund*.

¹⁷ Viktor Orbán's speech in *Tusnádfürdő* in 2014 also shows a significant overlap with a study published in March 2014 by Gyula Tellér: TELLÉR 2014.

¹⁸ The “buzzword” for illiberal democracy was introduced in 1997 by American political scientist Fareed Zakaria in an article published in the journal *Foreign Affairs*. By this he meant regimes that simultaneously displayed democratic and authoritarian norms, and where, while holding free elections, the government does not guarantee fundamental political or civil rights.

¹⁹ Merkel: „I can't interpret the word illiberal in terms of democracy.” HVG.hu 02/02/2015

²⁰ A letter from János Lázár, Secretary of State in charge of the Prime Minister's Office, to Vidar Helgesen, Norwegian Minister for European Affairs. 4/9/2014

²¹ Vidar Helgesen's letter from the Norwegian Minister for European Affairs to János Lázár, Secretary of State for the Prime Minister's Office. 4/24/2014

²² HVG.hu 06/05/2014

On 24 July, Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for *Human Rights of the Council of Europe*, expressed his concern at the attacks on the *Norwegian Civilian Support Fund* and the *Government Audit Office* investigations against him with a disputed legal basis, which he requested to be stopped.²³ Chronologically, the Prime Minister's speech in *Tusnádfürdő*, which we have already discussed above, was in line here.

Subsequently, on 14 August, the government issued Decree 204/2014. (14.VIII.) and it complied with one of the requests of the Norwegian party and returned the implementation of the nine programs managed by the *Norwegian Fund* from the *Széchenyi Program Office non-profit LLC*. to the competent ministry. The case itself continued beyond the investigation period of the present study, and the conflict was only resolved in December 2015.

In an urgent procedure, the *Parliament* passed legislation in 2014 primarily concerning the state administration and the organization of public administration. On the list of ministries of *Hungary*, and amending certain related laws legislation has also been adopted in this way, in addition, the legislature also amended, in an urgent procedure, the draft amendments to certain administrative laws and to the laws affecting certain local governments. In addition, the amendment of the law related to budgetary planning and the more efficient provision of financial market and public utility services was also discussed as a matter of urgency, as well as a proposal amending the laws on local government elections and the electoral procedure, which requires a two-thirds majority.

In an exceptionally urgent procedure, the *Parliament* discussed mainly politically sensitive, economic and tax-related laws. The Advertising Tax Act and amendments to related laws have also been discussed in this form, but several drafts on bank lending and loan agreements were also adopted under an exceptional procedure.

Regarding the structure of the new government, it is worth noting that examining the law on the listing of ministries, it can be stated that a kind of centralization approach has emerged – for example, a politician leading the *Prime Minister's Office* became minister armed with a number of important and new competencies.

The Parliament discussed three proposals which needed qualified majority in the first hundred days with the exception of public law bills necessarily related to the formation of a government, namely on the amendment of the *Rules of the House* and on the change of the rules of local elections and the rights of nationalities.

SUMMARY

One of the main critical elements of the public law changes between 2010 and 2014 was the fact that the government, with a two-thirds parliamentary majority, amends the *Constitution* in line with current policy – and later the *Basic Law* thus created – as well as the two-thirds and cardinal laws, respectively. The Basic Law – which is intended to create the legal framework of the Hungarian legal system – has become more of a power technical tool²⁴ due to the technical implementation of governance.

²³ Nils Muižnieks's, open letter from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights to the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office. 7/24/2014

²⁴ BÁRÁNDY-BÁRÁNDY 2015. 232.

Acting in its constitutional capacity, the *Parliament* also amended the electoral law, the provisions concerning the world of the media, and the powers of the *Constitutional Court*, at the same time, it can be observed that the legislators often sought a basis in principle behind the proposed amendments

It is clear that both governments started operating immediately, and even the *second Orbán government* made a decision with the *Parliament* requiring a qualified majority before taking the oath, quasi demonstrating their willingness to act. In terms of quality, the second *Orbán government* was widely criticized in 2010 for its operation, namely, that even the preparation of far-reaching, long-term, institution-transforming decisions is incomplete, imaginative, and improvisational.²⁵ There is a lack of or only formal social debate and conciliation on significant issues. It is important to emphasize that not only did the second *Orbán government* make constitutional amendments, but they also managed to adopt a new constitution, which entered into force on 1 January 2012.

In 2014, in the two-month spring session, lacking two days, the parliamentary and governmental activities affecting the division of power developed according to the methods learned in the 2010–2014 cycle. During the period under review, the *Parliament* discussed several bills in exceptional or urgent proceedings, and by deviating from house rules as in normal procedure. Proposals requiring a two-thirds majority were submitted and adopted as a motion by an individual representative, within a short deadline, usually without prior social and professional consultation. The style of parliamentary debate did not differ much from that of the previous four years thus, in terms of its style, process and content elements, the legislative process of the *Parliament* despite the new *House Rules*, it can be seen as a continuation of the previous four years.

A common point on the part of the two governments examined is that both governments have amended the law on municipal suffrage. An important difference, however, is that in 2010, obsolescence, inefficiency, and disproportion are referred to in the explanatory memorandum to the draft, as well as in parliamentary debates and the changes affect the entire system of local government, while in 2014 the amendment affected the capital city the most. In my previous study, I have already presented²⁶ the changes that the 2014 amendments brought to the non-capital level in practice in connection with the analysis of the election results in *Baranya County* and *Pécs*.

However, a number of issues have arisen in connection with the changes to the electoral system of the *Budapest City Assembly*, as it is much more than a power-maximizing transformation of the electoral system. It completely rearranged the power relations, the arenas of the operation of local government policy and partly the actors who could take part in it.

In summary, however, the rapid legislative work similar to 2010 was no longer so intensive in 2014, the data basically show that the first year of the third *Orbán government* reached significantly fewer times for urgent or exceptionally urgent negotiating modalities than in the first year of the government starting in 2010. While in 2010–2011 the *Parliament* passed a total of 65 laws by urgent procedure, in 2014–2015 only 6.²⁷ In the case of the second and third *Orbán*

²⁵ CSUHAJ 2010.

²⁶ NYERGES 2015.

²⁷ As the exceptionally urgent procedure was introduced only in 2012, there is no basis for comparison with these data, in any case, a further 10 drafts, discussed under the exceptionally urgent procedure, were adopted in the first year.

governments, we find many similarities, the ruling parties continued to try to assert their political, economic and power interests at a rapid pace. In the election campaign, *Fidesz* showed a more moderate face, but after the 2014 elections, they again resorted to the 2010 practice, that is, immediate action and rejection of compromises, so the style of government remained essentially unchanged. However, the “revolutionary heat” of 2010 and the “immediate justice” as motivations did not appear in 2014, since in most areas the immediate measures they consider necessary have already been taken in the previous government cycle. That the first year of the third *Orbán government* reached significantly fewer times for urgent or exceptionally urgent negotiating modalities than in the first year of the 2010 government.

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